The Institute of Development Studies is one of the world's leading charities for research, teaching and communications on international development. Founded in 1966, the Institute enjoys an international reputation based on the quality of its work and the rigour with which it applies academic skills to real world challenges. Its purpose is to understand and explain the world, and to try to change it -to influence as well as to inform.
1 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs? 12 Table 3 .2 Evidence on MDG impacts 13 Table 3 .3 Top ten most commonly selected MDG priorities in 22 PRSPs and 20 donor programmes 14 Table 3 .4 MDG national ownership in selected sub-Saharan African countries 15 Moss (2010) in Global Policy asked a question that few will currently ask openly and yet many are discussing informally in policy circles globally. He asked what might replace the MDGs in 2015? The responses to this question are likely to evolve rapidly in the next 18 months because there is only a relatively short time left for any post-2015 framework to be agreed and established (see Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 What could be the post-MDG timetable?
Sept 2010 To date, there has been concern in global policy circles that starting to discuss the post-2015 framework will divert attention (and possibly resources) away from the existing MDG framework. Achieving a new international consensus on a post-2015 framework is likely to be a lengthy process, particularly if there is to be a change in focus for the post-2015 framework. Making early progress, building alliances across the global community, and engaging in a fully consultative process where the voices of the poor are heard and their demands incorporated will take time and significant investments of political capital. The debate is already happening behind the scenes in discussion papers and internal workshops in various donor agencies and elsewhere.
This paper seeks to outline some of the key questions. We assess the policy impact of the MDGs and begin to ask questions about the nature of a post-MDG global framework. The main critiques of the MDGs (see Table 3 .1) have been: as an idea, the MDGs have a limited conceptual basis on defining development/progress/ change (as reductionist or incomplete human development); as a set of indicators, the MDGs have numerous limitations on measuring development/ progress/change; and as an institutional/incentive/accountability structure, the impact of the MDGs at country level is uneven at best, and the MDGs have had potentially distorting impacts, i.e. targeting of the near poor (easier to help and reach target) rather than the most poor. The policy impact of the MDGs to date can be assessed in greater detail via five channels (see Table 3 .2), in terms of: adoption (in policy); adaptation (to locally defined goals, indicators and targets); allocation (of resources); aberrations (and unintended distortions); acceleration of MDG progress in actual poverty reduction outcomes.
Recent analysis of the impact of the MDGs on the international poverty discourse found it to be 'strong, and significantly stronger than for previous attempts to use indicator sets to highlight issues', citing as evidence the MDG reports, high-level events and G8 discussions (Manning 2009: 25-6 ). Manning (pp 25-6) cites the following evidence:
Strengths Weaknesses
As a 'rallying call' for actors; as a common/shared understanding of poverty reduction.
Targets and indicators to guide and motivate policy decisions, and -in principle -accountability.
Pressure for more data on poverty.
Defining human development outcomes rather than opportunities to achieve outcomes.
Limited unifying theory on the structural causes of poverty; weak on social justice -equity, rights, vulnerability and exclusion.
A (mis?) perception that donor-led; and distorting impacts -transient vs. chronic poor. 
Aberrations (distortions and Unclear in general but evidence other forms that expected)
of poorest quintiles with considerably higher deprivations than average indicators and comparison of net primary and teacher ratios, for example in sub-Saharan (SS) Africa suggests net primary enrolment may have improved at the expense of education quality. Impacts at country level -in PRSPs, donor policy documents, and adaptation and acceleration of poverty reduction -are more mixed. In terms of impacts on PRSPs and donor statements, Fukuda-Parr (2010: 29) notes:
Acceleration (of poverty
All but four of the 22 PRSPs reviewed emphatically state commitment to the MDGs as a principle… and almost every one of the key MDG priority areas was included as a priority. However, of the eight goals, 34 targets and 60 indicators, some were emphasized more than others. Some were included as a pillar or a core objective of the PRSP, implementation plans clearly developed, and benchmarks for monitoring progress defined. Others were merely mentioned as an important objective without indication of how they would be implemented… As with the PRSPs, aid policy statements of major bilateral donors align with the MDG priorities only partially and in varying ways… While multidimensional poverty -including income poverty, education and health -is the stated central policy objective of almost all the bilateral aid programs, some objectives such as maternal mortality and child survival receive surprisingly limited emphasis. Table 3 .4). This is an area where evidence is thin though and further research is a priority. One benefactor from the MDGs, as Moss (2010) notes, has been ODA mobilisation and ODA mobilisation to MDG areas of health and education in particular. At a global level, bilateral ODA has gone up in absolute terms since 2000 from $46 billion to $74 billion and from 0.14 per cent of donors Gross National Income (GNI) to 0.20 per cent, but actually fallen slightly as a percentage of recipients' GNI (see Table 3 .5). There has been a structural shift towards social allocations and away from economic and productive sectors. In absolute terms, social sector, bilateral ODA spending has doubled 2000-2008 from about US$20 billion a year to over US$40 billion a year. In contrast, production-sector ODA has stagnated. If we consider SS Africa further, budget allocations of aid to both health and education-related MDG areas have increased in the MDG era (see Figure 3 .1 and 3.2). The move from productive sectors to social sectors, which one can partly attribute to the MDGs, can be seen as a good thing (a focus on achieving health and education goals, which are important); but it can also be seen as a distortion as it gives the (at least partly) erroneous impression that one can have long-term sustainable progress in education and health without a well-functioning, growing and strong economy (see discussion in Bourguignon et al. 2008) .
2008
Net The MDGs have also been criticised for other distortions. For example, the MDGs have given rise to vertical programming and central-planning type costing strategies (including, for example, the Millennium Commission), which have given the impression that reaching the MDGs is about totting up unit costs and delivering money. Further, the MDGs have arguably neglecting the very poorest by focusing on percentages and non-universal cover for the most part and towards achieving quantified targets at the expense of quality (Saith 2007) . Assessing these issues systematically is difficult. It is true that few of the MDGs are universal and many are proportional reduction targets, and even if MDG1 is met there will be 0.9bn people living on less than $1.25 a day. It is, though, not difficult to find MDG indicators much weaker among the poorest (for example U5M data in Democratic and Health Surveys (DHS) surveys -see Figure 3 .3) and a comparison of SS African improvements in net primary enrolment may have been at the expense of education quality using proxies such as teacher-student ratios (see Table 3 .6). Children under 5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births 32% 50% 63%
Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, total 76% 48% 39%
Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities, total 46% 58% 52%
4 What new issues that will have an impact on reducing poverty need to be taken into account in the design of a new framework?
MDG lessons aside, there are a number of difficult issues that any new framework will have to grapple with. These include the post-crisis context and fiscal squeeze; climate change and adaptation; and demography and urbanisation, to name but a few very large ones. These will make the run up to 2015 different from that of the run up to 2000.
An important difference is that the MDGs emerged in a relatively benign/ stable/fiscally buoyant period and any framework post-2015 might need to fit to the post-crisis context of periodic/multiple-source crises/instability, and a fiscally and carbon-constrained world. Development has changed significantly since the Millennium Declaration was signed in 2000 and the MDGs do not take account of: changes in the global balance of power and international relations; new financing instruments (including climate financing, innovative taxes and private sector flows); and natural resource conflicts.
There is a sense that the economic crisis marked an end to a benign era of relative stability, strong economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets, and the beginning of a different world or 'new normal' in the post-crisis context which may be one of multiple, inter-linked crises. Suffice to note at the outset, the conclusion of the US National Intelligence Council Report (2008: xii), based on a widespread and large academic consultation, is sobering. It reports that 'trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks and surprises'.
There is already emerging evidence that the economic crisis itself is leading to significant changes in the context for development more broadly. For example:
Global governance. The G8 to G20 shift means more representation and power for large developing nations, but changes in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank will be crucial for wider changes in governance.
New economic and social policies. There is likely to be a greater tendency for developing countries to explore new development models; approaches from China, the 'Beijing Consensus', are more likely to be taken up than Western prescriptions; the scale of food and financial crises has made a powerful case for better social protection systems, but building ownership in governments and civil societies remains a challenge in securing longterm budget allocations.
The rise of the G20 and its institutionalisation at the G20 Pittsburgh summit as the global body for economic coordination, marks a fundamental shift from the era in which the MDGs were agreed -where the OECD countries were the primary drivers and decision makers in global economic affairs. The shift from the G8 to the G20 is certainly a positive one in terms of representation of developing countries, but it is less clear what the impact will be. While the G8 has in recent years had Africa and the MDGs as a permanent item on its agenda, it has been harder to get issues relevant to the poorest countries, such as the MDGs, into the G20 discussions. Further, many issues appear to be narrowing to a G2, consisting of the US and China.
The economic context has also been shaken by the crisis, both because of the uncertainties created by the unexpected shocks to finance and trade and their knock-on effects on millions of lives, but also the shaking of confidence in what were previously thought to be the certainties of economic theory and practice. The Washington consensus has been declared dead (yet again), but the nature of the shift to a 'Beijing Consensus' or model (meaning a greater role for state-led or state-managed global integration) and policy experimentation is, as yet, unclear. The IMF (2010a, 2010b, 2010c) recently has questioned inflation targeting and capital controls and raised the prospects of new financial and bank taxes. Further, the discussion of 'global economic imbalances' at the G20, and the resulting agreement that governments have a role in directing markets in order to avoid 'imbalances', would have been an unthinkable break with the orthodoxy just a few years ago. But it is far from certain that the change in language in G20 declarations will have any long-term impact on policy.
Economic uncertainty in donor countries is also leading to declining public support for aid budgets. This is an immediate concern for policymakers over the next few years and will be critical in determining the economic and social policy environment. Looking further ahead there are some major 'game changers' beyond the recent economic crisis and food/fuel crisis, most notably climate change and demographic change/urbanisation, to name just two (see Tables 4 .1, 4.2 and 4.3) that will impact on the MDGs to 2015 and beyond. This includes the addition of an extra 760mn people over the next ten years on the medium variant trend, and Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate the cost of 'climate resilient' MDGs to be about a third higher than the conventional cost of meeting the MDGs -around US$100 billion a year for the next decade, compared with US$72 billion a year for the MDGs alone. Extra costs arise from having to provide more development support (for example, extra bed nets against malaria), the same support at a higher cost (for example, more expensive infrastructure) and new measures altogether (for example, adaptive capacity building). In one of the better-known estimates of adaptation costs (UNDP 2007), about half of the costs arise from social protection programmes that mitigate the adverse social impacts of climate shocks. One might also note the changing nature of aid itself in the rise of 'new' donors in the (Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC/BASICs) and wider afield; debates on climate finance which may dwarf 'traditional aid' flows; and innovative financing which is already changing the nature and structure of aid. All of this speaks to a political and economic environment of increasing uncertainty over the next decade or more, constituting perhaps a 'long crisis' (Evans et al. 2010) , or even what the UK's Chief Scientist, Professor John Beddington, (2009) refers to as a 'perfect storm'. Reducing poor people's livelihood assets;
Altering path and rate of economic growth;
Undermining food security.
Goal 2: Achieve universal
Destruction of schools/other primary education assets by extreme events;
Loss of livelihoods -reduced school attendance;
Disaster-related migration of families.
Goal 3: Promote gender
Reduced agricultural equality and empower women productivity/disasters can:
Burden women's health; Limit women's time to participate in decision-making/income generation activities; Reduce livelihood assets for women.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Climate change-induced extreme Goal 5: Improve maternal weather events are likely to health result in higher prevalence of Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, vector-and water-borne malaria and other diseases diseases, declining food security and decreased availability of potable water.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental
Climate change will directly sustainability impact on natural resources, ecosystems and the earth's natural cycles. This is predicted to reduce the quality and quantity of natural resources and ecosystems.
Source: Urban and Sumner (2009). Finally, what about the nature of global poverty? Even if MDG1 is met there will still be 0.9 billion poor people in 2015 and latest World Bank (2010: 115) estimates are that if recovery from the economic recession is rapid there will be an estimated 918 million poor people in 2015. However, if recovery is weak there will be 1.132 billion poor people in 2015. In either case around 40 per cent of the world's poor will live in SS Africa.
However, underlying these estimates is potentially a larger 'game changer' about the shifting global distribution of poverty which is estimated in depth in Sumner (2010) . Here we summarise briefly. In 1990 most of the world's poor people (93 per cent) lived in poor countries -meaning low-income countries (LICs). Two decades on, the world's poor -72 per cent, or almost one billion poor people -now live in middle-income countries (MIC) and 61 per cent of the world's poor live in stable MICs. LICs account for just 28 per cent of the world's poor, and fragile LICs account for just 12 per cent. This is a startling change over two decades. Contrary to earlier estimates that a third of the poor live in fragile and conflict-affected states, our estimate is about 23-26 per cent if one takes the broadest definition. The picture is fairly similar taking education, nutrition and the new UNDP multidimensional poverty index.
Is this just a China and India story? Yes and no. Over the past 20 years the proportion of the world's poor accounted for by China and India has fallen from two-thirds to a half. The percentage of global poverty in the MICs (minus China and India) has risen from 7 to 22 per cent. The percentage of global poverty in the LICs (minus China and India) has fallen from 31 per cent to 28 per cent. There is a wide range of initiatives that is seeking to revisit/rethink poverty and development indicators. Evidence of this is most visible in the recent Sarkozy Commission, chaired by Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, which has provided one of the most recent and strongest signposts of all with its conclusion that there is a need 'to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people's well being ' (2009: 10) . There is also:
Broader/updated human development -the major review of 20 years of the Human Development Report and assessment of the Human Development Indices by the UNDP Human Development Report Office and the new Multi-dimensional Poverty Index developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), as well as work on the 'missing dimensions of human development' -dimensions important to poor people but with little or no data -focusing on decent employment, agency and empowerment, physical safety, the ability to go about without shame, and psychological and subjective wellbeing (see for discussion, Alkire and Santos 2010).
'Human wellbeing' and poor people's own indicators -the Economic and Social Council-funded Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) network has developed a 'human wellbeing' approach which builds on human development and seeks to link together material, relational and subjective wellbeing and their interaction (see for discussion, McGregor and Sumner 2010).
One-world indicators -the OECD convened Measuring the Progress of Societies Project, amongst others, has discussed broader definitions of progress, such as sustainable wellbeing and intra-generational issues (poverty, inequality, etc.) and inter-generational issues (sustainability, vulnerability, etc.) . This would build on MDG8 and perhaps have climate adaptation as a focal point and building resilience at various levels.
There is also a range of initiatives that are seeking to revisit/rethink institutional arrangements beyond crude results-based management. For example:
Output-based aid approaches (also known as 'cash-on-delivery') -somewhat similar to results-based management but different where financing depends on delivery of key outputs such as teachers trained or reduction in poverty indicators rather than input-based indicators such as ODA spend (see for discussion, Birdsall and Savedoff 2010).
Post-bureaucratic approaches (also known as 'choice architecture') -developed by behavioural economists researching decision making (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein 2008) , this approach is based on the idea that human beings are very much influenced by their context (e.g. 'default choices') and respond to that context, or their 'choice architecture'.
One-world or mutual solidarity triggers -i.e. crisis-like trigger mechanisms where certain levels of deprivation or need trigger coordinated international and/or national response (with parallels to humanitarian approaches such as famine or natural disasters).
Indeed, aid more broadly and 'aid effectiveness' in particular are going through a major rethink (see detailed discussion in Evans 2010). There is the transparency and accountability revolution (see Barder 2010) , and there are much broader and deeper changes afoot. There is, further, a questioning of whether aid effectiveness debates have missed the point by focusing on quantity or quality of aid (Fischer 2009) , and even suggestions traditional ODA is dead (Severino and Ray 2009, 2010 In short, any post-MDG framework would need to pay greater attention to the emerging 'difficult' issues noted above such as climate and demography/ urbanisation, update thinking on better indicators and institutions, and have better Southern ownership, which would hopefully lead to systematic integration into national development strategies (and donor country plans).
Three stylised option for post-2015 could be outlined and assessed (see Tables  6.1 and 6 .2). First, an 'MDGs 2020/2025' -take the same goals, more-or-less, with a new deadline. Second, an MDG-Plus -take a small set of three or four 'core' universal goals such as child education, health and nutrition plus a small set of three or four new locally-defined goals and/or going beyond a human development focus (one narrative is that a focus on short-run poverty reduction has detracted from long-run transformation of societies and emancipation from aid). Third, a 'Millennium World' or 'One World' -an approach, building on MDG8, around addressing global issues with perhaps a focus on resilience and addressing climate change and other global challenges. The minimum option is really MDG-Plus because MDGs 2020/2025 (not to meet the MDGs and then to extend the deadline) would be politically difficult. However, the 'maximum' -One World -would be arguably better, building as it does on MDG8 on the global partnership.
One could imagine a combination of options as possibly most attractive. One should retain a core set of MDGs (basically income poverty/hunger, education, mortality and maybe water access) and set new, realistic global goals with regional sub-goals (that can then be translated into national goals). In addition, one should have some key 'One-World' indicators, largely on global public goods such as: eradication/vaccination/treatment of serious global diseases, mitigation of carbon emissions and adaptation to climate change, and maybe some global compact on results-based aid deliveries. The MDGs took ten years -a decade of momentum -and a small group of 'insiders' backed by powerful actors to get off the ground. The context has now changed: there are more MIC and a much greater range of donors (emerging economies such as China and private philanthropic foundations such as Gates) and opportunities to raise funds (through alternative/innovative financing mechanisms). In addition, there is a rise in the importance of the G20; a difficult context post-crisis for aid/public expenditures; risks of climate change to sustaining the progress achieved in the MDGs; and demographic change. Convene a high-level meeting on a 'new development consensus' that would become an evidence-base for what works and how to proceed with global poverty reduction in a changing climate in a much more integrated way.
Conduct a Stern-review on the economics or cost of global poverty, with the 'it's cheaper to address the causes of poverty now than the cost of the consequences later'.
Other important avenues will be the recently announced UNSG's High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, which will inevitably cover some MDG/post-MDG discussions as it develops its 'new development paradigm'. Already in the MDG 2010 summit negotiations there has been a call for a 2013 high-level review meeting and another in 2015 to focus on the development agenda beyond 2015 (either of which may play a role similar to the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit). In sum, there is relatively little time but plenty of opportunities to start a discussion and such debate is needed sooner rather than later if a global agreement is even a possibility.
